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Abstract.  This paper provides a consolidated, up-to-date overview of the changes to the CAP 
and the factors making for further reform from the particular perspective of decision-makers in 
developing countries. It discusses the principles and mechanisms by which EU farmers are 
supported under the CAP, and the way in which these mechanisms have been changing since the 
first major reform of the CAP was adopted in 1992. The main pressures for further reform of the 
CAP are identified, emphasising the political economy of further reform to provide some sense to 
developing country policy-makers of how these pressures for reform might play out in the future. 
Taking a horizontal approach, the impact of reform on developing countries of the three main 
policy instruments – domestic support, border protection and export subsidies – are then 
discussed, followed by a focus on a few commodities of particular interest to developing 
countries. The conclusion develops a checklist of factors which developing country policy-
makers can use to help track the evolution of the debate on CAP reform and its impact on 
developing countries.  
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Introduction 
 
The European Union’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) was introduced in the early 1960s.
3 It 
remains largely managed by the provisions of the 1957 Treaty of Rome.
4 With its combination of 
high and stable guaranteed prices, the CAP has been successful at boosting production, and also 
in easing the transformation of a largely rural society to an economy of manufacturing and 
services, limiting the human and economic cost of transition. However, the CAP has subsequently 
been the victim of its own success. The CAP arrangements resulted in large surpluses and budget 
crises in the 1980s. Because of the peculiar decision making process in the European Union, the 
required reforms were delayed until the early 1990s. Since then, the CAP has now changed 
dramatically after three successive reforms, the last one taking place in 2003 and being 
progressively implemented.  
 
From a developing country point of view, the impact of the reformed CAP on agricultural 
markets has become more complex. Even though the "new CAP" still has some unwanted effects, 
they are less direct and more difficult to assess. The traditional image of a "fortress Europe" that 
is closed to developing countries’ exports, while the EU dumps considerable quantities of 
agricultural products on these countries, hurting local producers, no longer fully corresponds to 
the new CAP arrangements. This is even though EU farmers are still heavily subsidised, and 
some high tariffs persist.  
 
This paper provides a brief description of the main CAP mechanisms and their effects on 
developing countries, with a particular attention to recent and future reforms. The motivation is to 
provide an accessible overview of the way the CAP works and how it has evolved over time, so 
that developing country policy-makers are in a better position to understand how the further 
reforms which are taking place, and which will take place in the future, may impact on them. 
 
Section 1 of the paper summarises the key dimensions of the EU agricultural economy in terms of 
production and trade, highlighting the significant differences which persist between the Member 
States which make up the European Union. Section 2 describes the principles and mechanisms by 
which EU farmers are supported under the CAP; it also explains the way in which these 
mechanisms have been changing, especially since the first major reform of the CAP was adopted 
in 1992.  
 
How important is the support provided to European farmers? Section 3 looks at various measures 
of support which quantify its importance. Important distinctions in this section are between 
                                                 
3 The legal name has changed over time; for convenience we use the term European Union throughout. The 
European Union was founded as the European Economic Community in 1958 by six states: Germany, 
France, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands and Luxembourg. The first enlargement took place in 1973 when the 
United Kingdon, Denmark and Ireland joined. Greece joined in 1981 followed by Spain and Portugal in 
1986, then Sweden, Finland and Austria in 1995. The most recent, and largest, enlargement occurred in 
2004 when ten countries joined. These are Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Malta, 
Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Slovenia and Cyprus. 
4 The European Communities (which became the European Union after the Maastricht Treaty) results from 
five legislative treaties. These are the 1951 Treaty of Paris establishing the Coal and Steel Community, the 
1957 Treaty of Rome establishing the Economic Community, the 1958 Treaty establishing the European 
Atomic Energy Community, the 1987 Single European Act and the 1993 Treaty of Maastricht. The 1997 
Treaty of Amsterdam and the 2000 Treaty of Nice amended the Treaty of Rome. The 1957 Treaty of Rome 
contains most of the founding texts setting up the CAP. The EU is in the process of replacing these treaties 
by a single constitution. However, the rejection of the proposed text for the EU constitution in 2005 by 
French and Dutch referendums raises doubts regarding the completion of the process.   3
budget-financed and consumer-financed support, and between trade-distorting and decoupled 
forms of support. Section 4 looks at the extent of external protection provided by the CAP. EU 
tariffs on agricultural imports are unquestionably high, but their impact is mitigated for many 
developing country exporters by preferential access arrangements of one kind or another. Section 
5 looks at the contentious issue of export subsidies; it argues that their scale, and thus the 
significance of their trade-distorting impact, is now much less than in the past.  
 
Section 6 identifies the main pressures for further reform of the CAP. It also discusses the 
political economy of further reform to provide some sense to developing country policy-makers 
of how these pressures for reform might play out in the future. Our conclusion is that the balance 
of forces makes further reform highly likely, even if it is somewhat delayed. This leads to the 
obvious question of how further reform will affect developing countries. 
 
This issue is discussed in Section 7. Taking a horizontal approach, the impact of reform of the 
three main policy instruments – domestic support, border protection and export subsidies – is first 
discussed. This is then followed by a focus on a few commodities of particular interest to 
developing countries. Finally, Section 8 develops a checklist of factors which developing country 
policy-makers can use to help track the evolution of the debate on CAP reform and its impact on 
developing countries.  
 
1. European agriculture 
 
The protection of European agriculture did not start with the Common Agricultural Policy. Three 
waves of protection can be distinguished. Competition in grains, dairy products and meat from 
the newly settled areas of North America and Oceania, together with the revolution in 
transportation and refrigeration during the last quarter of the nineteenth century, led a number of 
European countries to introduce protection of domestic agriculture and especially the grain sector. 
A second wave of protection took place in the depressed interwar period, when agricultural 
intervention and self-sufficiency policies were adopted or intensified by both importers and 
exporters.A third wave arose as a result of post war reconstruction and the concomitant balance of 
payments difficulties experienced by Western European governments, together with the 
memories of wartime and immediate post-war food shortages. Thus when a number of European 
countries came together to form the European Economic Community in 1958, how to weld the 
various national agricultural policies into a Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) was one of the 
main hurdles to overcome. 
 
The CAP was introduced in the early 1960s at a time where farming accounted for a large share 
of Europe's GDP and population. In the late 1950s, primary agriculture accounted for one-third of 
employment and 20% of GDP in the six founding members of the European Union. By the early 
2000s, these proportions had fallen to 5% and 2% respectively, though the importance of the 
EU’s strong agri-food industry must also be taken into account.  
 
The early CAP introduced a system of guaranteed prices through public intervention, and some 
funding for structural actions, such as improving farm size and infrastructure. By bringing stable 
prices and a predictable planning horizon, the CAP helped the modernisation of agriculture and 
the diffusion of technological change. At the same time, a considerable restructuring of the sector 
took place, with a rapid outflow of labour to jobs in the growing manufacturing and services 
sectors in the 1960s and 1970s, which resulted in larger average farm size. 
 
 
   4
1.1. Structure and performance 
 
The structure of farming is still very differentiated across regions after 45 years of a common 
agricultural policy. Production and performance varies across the 25 member states. In some 
countries, such as the United Kingdom, agriculture takes places on large farms, and only a very 
small share of the population is employed in the farm sector (roughly 1%). In other countries, in 
particular in some of the new member states but also Greece and Portugal, farmers still account 
for 10 to 16% of the population. There are more than two million agricultural holdings in Poland, 
for example. In Poland, Hungary or Slovenia, the average farm size is less than 7 hectares. The 
productivity of agriculture also varies greatly across countries. Yields for cereals are very high in 
some regions in the United Kingdom, France or Italy, while agriculture in mountainous regions is 
much less productive, on a per hectare basis. Productivity is also low in countries characterised 
by small holdings and a farm workforce which is poorly educated. That is, the CAP has done 
little to offset natural differences across countries. By providing support as a function of the 
quantities produced, it may have even reinforced them. 
 
 
Figure 1. Map of the EU25 and candidate countries  
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Within each country, agriculture is also much differentiated, with large scale commercial 
producers often coexisting with a large number of small farms. Small farms are often operated by 
older farmers. A recent Eurostat study reveals that, in Italy, 62 percent of farmers are over 55 
years old. The percentage is 56 and 53 per cent for Greece and Spain respectively (even though in 
Finland, Germany and Austria only 27 per cent of farmers are over 55).
5 This suggests that a 
large number of small farms are likely to be absorbed by larger entities in the near future.  
 






















Belgium  1392 1.0  1.7  55 25.4  85 
Czech 
Republic 
3 674  1.1  4.5  54  66.9  41 
Denmark 2  641  1.6  3.3  49  54.7  71 
Germany 17  008  0.7  2.4  412  41.2  65 
Estonia 796  2.2  6.3  37 21.6  22 
Greece 3  897  5.4  16.3  na  na  26 
Spain 25  270  3.6  5.6  na  na  31 
France 29  430 2.0  4.3  614  45.3  64 
Ireland 4  370 1.9  6.4  135 32.3  83 
Italy 15  097  2.2  4.7  na  na 44 
Cyprus  136 3.7  5.2  45 3.5 Na 
Latvia 1  582  2.1  14.6  141  10.2 28 
Lithuania 2  531  2.6  18.7  279  9.1  36 
Luxembourg  128 0.5  2.4  3 52.3 61 
Hungary 5  865  2.7  5.4  773  5.6  37 
Malta 11  1.6  2.5 11  1.0  Na 
Netherlands 1  924  2.0  2.7  86  23.5  88 
Austria 3  374 1.2  5.5  na  na  44 
Poland  16 136  2.3  18.2  2 178  7.0  34 
Portugal 3  745  2.5  12.8  na  na  12 
Slovenia  509 1.6  8.4  77 6.3 Na 
Slovakia 2  236  1.2  6.0  72  29.8  30 
Finland 2  246  1.0  5.3  75  29.9  35 
Sweden 3  129  0.6  2.5  68  46.1  56 
United 
Kingdom 
16 352  0.7  1.2  281  57.4  77 
EU-25 163  479 1.6  5.2  na  na  54 
* including forestry and fishing. Source: Eurostat and European Commission. 
 
Concentration of farmland will occur in the most productive regions. However, there are also 
areas where farmland is returning to wilderness in Europe, because of the lack of profitability of 
agriculture. In other areas, there is a significant development of part time farming, which helps to 
maintain relatively small farm structures. Part-time work is particularly widespread in Southern 
Europe. In Greece, Portugal, Italy and Spain, half of all farmers and more than half of all 
agricultural labourers work part-time. The reason is mainly that full-time work is impossible on 
the existing structures. In other countries, such as Ireland and Germany, where part time farming 
                                                 
5 Eurostat is the Statistical Office of the European Union, based in Luxembourg. It compiles statistics for 
the EU 25, using data provided by national statistical agencies.   6
is also widespread (almost one farmer in three engaged in a non-agricultural gainful activity), 




One of the motivations of the CAP was to develop domestic production, at a time when the 
memory of food scarcity in the immediate post-war years was still recent. As the scientific 
revolution in farming took hold, EU production has surged, facilitated by the high and stable 
prices guaranteed by the CAP. The net deficit situation in the 1950s was transformed into a net 
surplus food situation in most sectors by the 1970s.  
 
Technically, however, the EU 25 remains a net importer of food products. According to the latest 
statistics available, the EU25 imported some 58.1 billions euros of agricultural food and tobacco 
products, and exported 49.5 billion euros of the same products.
6 Imports include very large 
quantities of fruits, fish, oilseeds and feedstuffs. Tropical products account for a large share of the 
imports. EU exports include a lot of processed products such as wine and alcoholic beverages, but 
also some dairy products and beef, some of them subsidised (Table 2). 
 
Table 2. External trade of the EU-25 (million euros) 
   Import Export 
1 Live  Animals  540  967 
2  Meat And Edible Meat Offal  2 849  3 892 
3  Fish And Crustaceans  9 940  1 829 
4  Dairy; Eggs; Honey; Edible Products Of Animal Origin  1 038  5 203 
5  Products Of Animal Origin  865  413 
6  Live Trees And Other Plants; Bulbs  1 206  1 365 
7  Edible Vegetables And Certain Roots And Tubers  2 723  1 449 
8  Edible Fruit And Nuts; Peel Of Citrus Fruits Or Melons  10 011  1 478 
9 Coffee  3 638  828 
10  Cereals  2 380  1 612 
11  Products Of The Milling Industry; Malt; Starches; Gluten  65  1 884 
12  Oil Seeds And Oleaginous Fruits; Miscellaneous Grains  5 423  944 
13 Lac;  Gums  458  525 
14  Vegetable Plaiting Materials; Vegetable Products  98  12 
15  Animal Or Vegetable Fats And Oils   3 454  2 482 
16  Preparations Of Meat  2 966  914 
17  Sugars And Sugar Confectionery  1 646  1 817 
18  Cocoa And Cocoa Preparations  2 934  1 908 
19  Preparations Of Cereals  718  3 451 
20  Preparations Of Vegetables  3 270  2 388 
21  Miscellaneous Edible Preparations  1 372  4 010 
22  Beverages  3 933  13 263 
23  Residues Prepared Animal Fodder  6 480  1 520 
24  Tobacco And Manufactured Tobacco Substitutes  1 939  2 447 
52 Cotton  3 413  3 993 
Source Eurostat, million euros, figures for 2004, HS classification. 
                                                 
6 Imports CIF, exports FOB, data for the last twelve months starting may 2004, SITC classification, source 
Eurostat.   7
2. How Europe protects its farmers – the principles 
 
2.1. The "old" CAP 
 
For a long time, the CAP has been the only genuinely common policy in the European Union, i.e. 
the only one managed at the EU level.
7 It still represents half of the community budget (the main 
reason being that other policies are managed at the national level). 
 
Initiated in the early 1960s, the CAP is a domestically oriented farm policy based on three major 
principles: i/ a unified market in which there is a free flow of agricultural commodities within the 
EU; ii/ product preference in the internal market over foreign imports through common customs 
tariffs; and iii/ financial solidarity through common financing of agricultural programmes through 
the EU budget.  
 
The listed objectives of the CAP are to increase agricultural productivity; ensure a fair standard of 
living for farmers; stabilise markets; guarantee regular food supplies; and ensure reasonable 
prices to consumers. However, not all these objectives have been reached (and some are actually 
quite contradictory). The "fair" standard of living for farmers has been achieved in a limited 
number of countries, such as the United Kingdom. In others (Germany, Portugal), farm incomes 
are much lower than those of the average population. Low farm incomes have been the driving 
force behind the considerable restructuring of the sector in countries such as France, Italy or 
Spain, where the farm population has decreased at a very high rate for the last 30 years, and 
where average farm size has increased dramatically.  
 
The CAP has relied since 1962 on a variety of instruments to reach the objectives of the Rome 
Treaty. The first component of the CAP, and by far the largest in terms of financial outlay, is the 
market intervention mechanism, funded by the "Guarantee" instrument of the European 
Agricultural Guarantee and Guidance Fund or FEOGA, the EU Agricultural Budget.
8 It funds a 
combination of market interventions, public storage, border protection and export subsidies so as 
to guarantee a minimum price to producers, known as Common Market Organisations (hereafter 
CMOs). The CMOs cover all sectors with the exception of potatoes and spirits.
9  In order to 
maintain a minimum price for producers, a system of variable levies ensured that imports would 
not enter the Community at lower prices, and a system of disposal of surplus domestic production 
with the aid of export subsidies ("refunds" in the EU language) was put in place. This system 
made it possible to stabilise farmers' incomes, and had the advantages of providing a stable price 
and a predictable planning horizon to producers. 
 
The second component of the CAP was a socio-structural and rural development policy (funded 
by the "Guidance" instrument of FEOGA). This policy initially focused on the improvement of 
farm and processing structures. It has always represented a relatively small share of the budget of 
the CAP. 
                                                 
7 The other truly common policy is the common external policy governing trade relations with third 
countries. However, unlike the CAP, the common external policy does not make demands on the budget. 
8 The creation of the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF, more often called by 
the French acronym FEOGA that we will use hereafter) in 1962 provided the financial instrument for the 
management of the CAP.  
9 While some CMOs have involved very large market intervention and budget costs (grains, beef, dairy, 
and oilseeds in the 1980s) and have largely substituted public intervention for market mechanisms, some 
others like horticulture or pork have had a limited impact on markets, and have used rather parsimoniously 
public instruments designed to smooth the functioning of markets.   8
 
In addition to EU expenditure on agricultural policy, spending by the Member States remains 
important, particularly in areas of structural policy and general services to farmers (research, 
extension, education and market information). However, under the provisions of the Rome 
Treaty, member states cannot subsidise farmers for activities that could result in a distortion of 
competition. That is, the CAP is highly centralised at the EU level. This is not the case for side 
policies, such as environmental policies, in which member countries have larger latitude when 
designing their own policies. 
 
Minimum (or intervention) prices under the Guarantee instrument of FEOGA were set at 
relatively high levels and subsequently increased as a result of political compromises in the 1970s 
and 1980s. With the combined effect of high and stable prices and rapid technological change 
bringing real production costs down, agricultural production grew faster than consumption. The 
EU agricultural sector began to generate surplus production in the 1970s, and the problem 
became worse in the 1980s. Disposal of surpluses on the domestic market (milk powder included 
in animal feedstuffs) or on third markets (export subsidies) required substantial budget 
expenditure. The CAP also had unwanted consequences for producers in third countries, who had 
to face competition from EU subsidised exports, raising problems at the international level. The 
"subsidies" war with the United States during the 1980s drove down the world price of cereals 
and dairy products to a very low level, requiring additional export subsidies to cover the increased 
gap with the intervention price.  
 
After years of ineffective measures, a significant reform first took place in 1992. It curbed the 
mechanism of market intervention, which provided incentives for farmers to produce regardless 
of market conditions. Guaranteed prices have since been lowered under successive reforms.  
 
 
Box 1. EU Decision Making 
In the present European Union, the Council of Agricultural Ministers (the Agricultural Council) has the 
main responsibility for CAP-related decisions, but the Commission plays an important role by preparing 
proposals and ensuring application of the Council's decisions.  
The Council is the meeting of the 25 government representatives. When it consists of the heads of state and 
government, it is called the European Council which meets four times a year. This Council sets the main 
orientations of the EU. For sectoral policies, Member States are represented by the relevant government 
minister, e.g. the ministers of agriculture for CAP related aspects. The Council of Ministers is the real 
executive power, and is the ultimate decision-making institution, especially in agriculture where the role of 
the Parliament is limited. The presidency of the Council rotates on a six-month basis, but since 1998 there 
is a relative sharing of responsibility within a "troïka" (the President, the immediate predecessor and the 
designated successor). In foreign matters, the country holding the presidency speaks on behalf of the EU. In 
addition, the role of the President is particularly important because the minister of the country in charge 
draws up the agenda of the council meetings. This makes it possible to progress or delay reforms depending 
on the interest of the member state in a particular topic. 
The Commission constitutes the EU executive arm. It is responsible for the management of EU policies 
including the CAP. It represents the EU in negotiations with third countries. The Commission watches the 
implementation of the treaties and is the initiator of policies. The Commission includes 20 commissioners, 
appointed by Member States. The president of the Commission allocates a particular area of responsibility 
to each commissioner, but all proposals and measures must be adopted by the Commission as a body. A 
new Commission is appointed every five years, and the current Commision’s term of office runs until 
October 2009. The current Commissioner for Agriculture and Rural Development is a former Danish 
Minister for Agriculture, Mariann Fischer Boel. Each Commissioner works with a Directorate General (e.g. 
Commissioner Fischer-Boel with the Directorate General for Agriculture and Rural Development). In   9
agriculture and trade (as well as in competition policy) the Commission has special powers. In the area of 
trade, the Commission has the power to negotiate treaties on behalf of the member states. This gives the 
Trade Commissioner (currently Peter Mandelson) the capacity to speak on behalf of the whole EU, even 
though the outcome of the negotiation is scrutinised by member states (the Council and Parliament must 
ultimately approve trade agreements). 
The European Parliament has had an increasing role in policy making since the Maastricht Treaty. It 
nominates the Commission, contributes to the making of EU regulations and directives (with the Council), 
votes the budget, and investigates petitions from EU citizens. It can therefore amend legislative proposals 
from the Commission, including the budget. However, in the area of the CAP, the power of the parliament 
is particularly limited. The Council of Ministers needs to consult the Parliament but can proceed without 
approval of its decisions by the Parliament. The only agricultural area where the Parliament has important 
power is the one related to the impact on human health, where the Treaty of Amsterdam gives the 
Parliament the power of co-decision on matters related to public health. The Parliament can force the whole 
Commission to resign, but has limited pressure on a particular Commissioner. 
The Court of Justice regulates conflicts between EU institutions, and between EU institutions and a 
member country. It can be approached by individuals and firms about the application of a EU text by a 
member states, and by national courts for interpretation of European texts. The European Court of Auditors 
reviews accounts and reports to the Council and the Parliament. It has reviewed several CAP arrangements, 
and has often been very critical (review of the sugar policy in 1991, review of the environmental aspects of 
the CAP in 2000, for example). 
 
 
2.2. CAP Reforms  
 
Major reform packages have significantly modified the CAP over the last decade. The first 
reform, adopted in 1992 and implemented in 1993/94, began the process of shifting farm support 
from prices to direct payments. The 1992 reform reduced support prices and created direct 
payments based on historical yields, and introduced supply control measures. This reform 
affected the grain, oilseed, protein crop (field peas and beans), tobacco, beef, and sheepmeat 
markets. The core element was a nominal cut of 30% in cereal prices, together with (smaller) cuts 
in intervention prices for beef and butter. The impact on farmer's income of these reductions in 
support prices was compensated by a generous per hectare payment in the case of cereals, and by 
premium payments for beef cows and cattle. The 1992 reform introduced a set-aside scheme 
which allowed the Commission to curtail the area devoted to arable crops.
10 The reform was 
accompanied by an early retirement scheme, an agri-environment scheme and a scheme for 
afforestation, designed to reduce production capacity, to improve the structure of farming, and to 
address some growing environmental concerns about the effect of agricultural practices. 
 
Further changes took place in 1995 to accommodate the CAP to the newly-agreed disciplines of 
the WTO Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture. Variable levies converted to fixed tariffs 
(though with exceptions for fruits and vegetables, and special provisions for cereals, under which 
the tariffs must automatically go down if the intervention price is lowered). Minimum access 
                                                 
10 "Set-aside" is a measure under which farmers must keep a certain percentage of arable land out of 
production in order to get payments. This policy was heavily used during the period 1993-2004, since a 
mandatory set aside of 10 to 15% of land devoted to arable crops (depending on the year) was required to 
get the arable crops payments. The objective was to reduce production, and therefore the surplus that had to 
be exported with subsidies. Since 2005, set aside is on a voluntary basis. A farmer can get paid for leaving 
land in fallow, in particular for conservation (environmental) objectives.   10
requirements were introduced, which were met by tariff rate quotas.
11 Disciplines also introduced 
on the overall amount of trade-distorting domestic support which could be provided, and on the 
quantity of subsidized exports and the value of export subsidy expenditure. 
 
The Agenda 2000 programme, introduced in 1999, was the second major reform implemented in 
preparation for EU enlargement to include the ten countries of central and eastern Europe. In a 
similar way to the first CAP reform, the Agenda 2000 arrangements used direct payments to 
compensate farmers for the loss from new support price cuts (15% for cereals and 20% in beef 
production). This time, however, compensation was only partial. Agenda 2000 reforms focused 
on the grain, oilseed, dairy, and beef markets. Agenda 2000 also introduced a major change in the 
overall philosophy of the CAP, by promoting the idea of a "second pillar". That is, instead of 
supporting agricultural production (the "first pillar"), public policy would support more the 
provision of environmental and social services, or the promotion of quality products. While this 
"second pillar" remained limited in terms of budgetary outlays, it constituted a major change in 
the overall orientation of the CAP, paving the way for future reforms. Following Agenda 2000, 
the various environmental and rural development measures were brought together into a single 
Rural Development Regulation. 
 
The midterm review of Agenda 2000 in June 2003 resulted in a third major set of reforms. The 
2003 reforms allow for decoupled payments—payments that do not affect production decisions—
that vary by commodity. Called single farm payments (SFP), these decoupled payments are based 
on the 2000-02 historical payments received by farmers and replace the compensation payments 
introduced by the 1992 reform. In order to receive the SFP, compliance with EU regulations 
regarding environment, animal welfare, and food quality and safety is required. Cuts in 
intervention prices were made for rice, butter, and skim milk powder, to begin in 2005. 
Intervention support for storage was limited for rice and butter and eliminated for rye in 2004. In 
addition, the CAP budget ceiling has been fixed from 2006-13, and—if market support and direct 
payments combine to come within 300 million euros of the budget ceiling—SFPs will be reduced 
to stay within budget limits. 
 
 
Box 2. The June 2003 Reform: Decoupled support 
 
On 26 June 2003, EU farm ministers adopted a fundamental reform of the CAP. After an initial period of 
adjustment, the vast majority of subsidies will be paid independently from the volume of production. To 
avoid abandonment of production, Member States may choose to maintain a limited link between subsidy 
and production under well-defined conditions. These new "Single Farm Payments" are linked to respect of 
environmental, food safety and animal welfare standards. More money will be made available to farmers 
for environmental, quality or animal welfare programmes by reducing direct payments for bigger farms. 
The Council further decided to revise the milk, rice, cereals, durum wheat, dried fodder and nut sectors. In 
order to respect the tight budgetary ceiling for the EU-25 until 2013, ministers agreed to introduce a 
financial discipline mechanism. The different elements of the reform entered into force in 2004 and 2005. 
The single farm payment entered into force in 2005. If a Member State needs a transitional period due to its 
specific agricultural conditions, it may apply the single farm payment from 2007 at the latest. 
 
The key elements of the reform are : 
                                                 
11 A tariff rate quota allows either all exporters or designated exporters to export a specified quantity of 
production into the EU at a lower tariff, the in-quota tariff, than the ordinary Most Favoured Nation (MFN) 
tariff which would normally apply, the out-of-quota tariff. Becdfause the volume of exports at the 
preferential in-quota tariff rate is limited, specific administrative arrangements to allocate export rights 
among exporting countries are required as part of tariff rate quota.   11
 
● A single farm payment for EU farmers, independent from production; limited coupled elements may be 
maintained to avoid abandonment of production. This payment is linked to respect of environmental, food 
safety, animal and plant health and animal welfare standards, as well as the requirement to keep all 
farmland in good agricultural and environmental condition (these conditions are referred to as "cross-
compliance").  
 
● A strengthened rural development policy, new measures to promote the environment, quality and animal 
welfare and to help farmers to meet EU production standards starting in 2005.  
 
● A reduction in direct payments ("modulation") for bigger farms to finance the new rural development 
policy. 
 
● A mechanism for financial discipline to ensure that the farm budget fixed until 2013 is not overshot.  
 
● Revisions to the market policy of the CAP. The intervention price for butter will be reduced by 25% over 
four years, which is an additional price cut of 10% compared to Agenda 2000. For skimmed milk powder a 
15% reduction over three years, as agreed in Agenda 2000, is retained. The monthly increments in the 
cereals sector are reduced by half, and the current intervention price will be maintained. Reforms are 
implemented in the rice, durum wheat, nuts, starch potatoes and dried fodder sectors.  
 
 
Finally, a reform of hops and Mediterranean products—cotton, tobacco, and olive oil—was 
completed in April 2004. These reforms follow the logic of the 2003 reforms, with decoupled 
payments based on historical payments and compliance with EU regulations. A reform of the 
sugar regime has been proposed by the Commission (this sector had not been touched by earlier 
CAP reforms) which it hopes will be approved by November 2005.  
 
2.3. A more decoupled support 
 
Altogether, the CAP has changed dramatically over the last 12 years. Intervention prices have 
been cut by more than 45% in the cereal sector, for example. A large share of the support to 
farmers, which was paid by consumers through high institutional prices, is now paid by taxpayers 
as direct payments to farmers with no direct link with the quantities the produce. A significant 
change in the CAP is the transfer of money between CAP objectives. The announced 
reorientation of the CAP towards the "second pillar" is now more concrete. After full 
implementation of the July 2003 reform, 5% of the value of the SFP for large farmers will be 
"modulated" and transferred to rural development measures.  
 
The decoupling of the payments from production modifies considerably the orientation of the 
CAP. Instead of receiving money for the quantities produced, farmers now receive a single 
payment, a fixed amount based on what they received in the agreed reference period in the past, 
so that production decisions should no longer be driven by the attempt to maximise subsidies: the 
only way farmers can increase their income is now from the marketplace. Farmers receive the 
same payment regardless of their production (they can also continue to set aside land; however, 
eligibility for the SFP will continue to require demonstration of "good agricultural practice" and 
farmland cannot be abandoned). A single farm payment should also reduce incentives for farmers 
to intensify production, although the actual effects of the reform on yields and animal stocking 
per hectare remain to be seen. The SFP should also reduce the administrative burden on farmers, 
make it easier to extend CAP payments to farmers in the accession countries, and reduce the 
leakage between the amount paid by taxpayers and consumers and the amount received by 
producers.  
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Finally, the SFP was designed with the criteria of "green box" supports in the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) in mind.
12 The EU hopes that the reform will make it easier to defend the 
CAP payments in the WTO in the future. 
 
However, the degree of decoupling varies across countries. In that sense, the June 2003 reform 
has introduced a certain degree of re-nationalization of the CAP. Member states were allowed to 
retain a proportion of the previous production-linked payments based on a series of menu choices, 
and to continue to pay some fraction of these former payments.
13 While some countries opted for 
full decoupling, some others, such as France, fearing the abandonment of production in large 
areas, choose to keep as many payments linked to the number of head of cattle and sheep as it 
was legally permitted. 
 
3. The degree of farm support in the EU 
 
3.1. Budget based measures  
 
There are multiple ways to measure agricultural support. One way is to count the budget that is 
provided to farmers, or to agricultural policy in general. Using such an indicator, total EU 
expenditures for the agricultural sector for the budget year 2003 reached 37.8 billion euros (for 
EU15). Some 4.7 billion euros extra went to rural development (source FEOGA). The CAP 
budget includes some 20 billions of direct payments to farmers. Other expenses include storage, 
export subsidies, etc. In addition, additional expenditures are made by the Member States either 
as co-financing of CAP measures or as national aids within the framework of EU competition 
policy on state aids. 
 
From this budget, not all money went to farmers. Indeed, some of the money spent, say, on export 
subsidies leaks to foreign consumers. Some of the structural measures benefit also the processing 
sector. Some of the direct payments are capitalised in the price of fixed assets and benefit 
landowners. For these reasons budget outlays could overestimate the transfers to farmers. On the 
other hand, budget expenditures do not provide a complete picture of all the support to farmers, 
since they measure only support paid by taxpayers, not the support paid by consumers through 
supported prices. In order to solve this problem, two measures have been developed, one by the 
WTO and the other one by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.  
 
3.2. The Aggregate Measure of Support 
 
One of the drawbacks of the budget outlays figure is that this measure does not take into account 
an indirect way to support farmers, through higher prices paid by consumers: the market price 
support component. This is why the official measure of trade-distorting support that was agreed 
upon by countries that have signed the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (i.e. the 148 
members of the World Trade Organisation) includes a measure of market price support. 
 
                                                 
12 "Green box" support, in WTO terminology, includes farm support that has no or minimal effect on 
production, such as environmental subsidies or decoupled payments. 
13 Member states could, for example, pay 25% of the arable aid payment or 40% of the durum wheat 
payment; pay 50% of the exe premium; pay 100% of the suckler beef cow premium and 40% of the 
slaughter premium or 100% of the slaughter premium or 75% of the special male premium. 
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Under the WTO, the Aggregate Measure of Support (AMS) attempts to measure all forms of 
support that distort markets. That is, the AMS takes into account direct payments that provide 
some incentive to increase production, i.e. payments that have some link to the quantities 
produced or the use of inputs (payment per hectare, etc.) as well as market price support. Market 
price support is measured as the difference between "administered" prices such as minimum 
prices paid to producers and the world price, the latter being kept constant at a reference level, so 
that the AMS is not affected by exogenous fluctuations. 
 
Countries are somewhat tardy in making returns to the WTO, and the latest AMS figure available 
for the EU is for the marketing year 2001/2002, i.e. for EU15. The combination of trade-
distorting support (direct support and market price support) as measured by the AMS amounted to 
39.3 billion euros. 
 
If the introduction of market price support gives a more reliable picture than the focus on 
budgetary outlays only, there are also limitations to the AMS. The measure does not include 
support that has ambiguous effects on production, such as the payments subject to quantitative 
limitations (e.g. arable crop payments subject to the requirement of setting aside land). These 
payments are excluded from the AMS as part of the "blue box". It is true that the effect of these 
payments on third countries is unclear, since the production incentive of the payment is limited by 
some supply control conditions. However, these "blue box" payments represent a significant 
amount of assistance in the EU, at least before the implementation of the June 2003 reform: for 
the marketing year 2002/2003, they amounted to 23.7 billion euros.  
 
3.3. The Producer Support Estimate 
 
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) monitors agricultural 
policies in its 30 member countries every year. The OECD has put together a measure of the 
transfers to producers: the Producer Support Estimate or PSE. This is a broader concept than the 
AMS, because it not only includes market price support, but also payments that have no link with 
production, such as environmental and social payments, as long as they benefit producers. Unlike 
the AMS, the market price support is measured as the gap between producer price and the actual 
world price in each particular year, using nominal exchange rates. That is, the PSE can vary even 
though domestic policies remain unchanged, simply because world prices or exchange rates have 
fluctuated. On the other hand, this gives a picture of support more in line with actual market 
situations.  
 
The OECD measure is comprehensive and (unlike the AMS) up to date. However, the measure is 
not flawless. Because some commodities are not covered by the precise calculations of support, 
the average PSE of those commodities whose support is precisely calculated is applied to these 
other products. In the case of the EU, the products not covered tend to benefit from less support, 
so the PSE measure could be biased upwards. Second, in some cases, the world reference price 
used to calculate market price support is questionable: this is the case in the dairy sector (in the 
absence of a world market for raw milk, the producer price in New Zealand is used as a 
reference). Again, this could introduce a bias, because this reference is not particularly 
meaningful. These limitations aside, overall, the PSE gives a picture of transfers to EU farmers 
that is reasonably accurate. 
 
The PSE provides a detailed description of the various components of support in the EU 
(Table 3). If one adds up market price support and direct payments, EU farmers receive some 100 
billion euros of transfers, even though only a proportion of this is actually support to production. 
With a value exceeding 39 billion euros, the market price support mechanisms still result in large   14
transfers to producers. However, direct payments are now the major form of support in the EU. 
Although this is not yet reflected in Table  3 which refers to a situation prior to the full 
implementation of the June 2003 reforms, these payments are now largely decoupled from 
production. 
 
One use for the PSE indicator is to compare trends in support across countries and over time. For 
this purpose, the PSE can be expressed in percentage form as a proportion of total farm revenue 
(including support). For OECD countries as a whole, the percentage PSE has fallen from 37% to 
30% between 1986-88 and 2004 (Table 4). Support provided to EU farmers has always been a 
little higher than in other OECD countries, but has followed the same downward trend, falling 
from 41% in 1986-88 to 33% in 2004. The  EU provides more support to its farmers than does the 
US (PSE of 18% in 2004) or Australia (4% in 2004) but less than Japan (56%) and some of the 
European countries outside the EU (Iceland, Norway and Switzerland).  
 
 
Table 3. Producer Support Estimates, 2004 
All products  EU15 (million euros) 
Total value of production  250 933 
Producer support estimates  100 264 
  Market price support (measured on a subset of products)  39 045 
  Market price support (extrapolation to all commodities)  53 932 
  Payments based on output  3 540 
  Payments based on area planted/animal numbers  29 332 
  Payments based on historical entitlements  608 
  Payments based on input use  8 102 




Table 4. Relative PSE percentage levels for selected OECD countries 
Country 1986-88  2004 
Australia 8  4 
EU-25 41  33 
Japan 61  56 
United States  22  18 
OECD average  37  30 
Source:  OECD 
 
 
4. Border protection  
 
EU border protection has long been held responsible for preventing developing countries from 
exporting agricultural products to the EU. Border protection, domestic support and export 
subsidies are not independent policies; border protection is required to underpin the market price 
support discussed in the previous section. Agricultural tariffs must be high enough to prevent 
imports from flooding the market, or being sold for intervention. The elimination of such tariffs 
would require giving up, or at least lowering considerably, intervention prices. 
 
As a result of the willingness to enforce community preference, agricultural tariffs are particularly 
high in the EU. Bound tariffs in this sector average 18%, but there are high peaks in some 
particular sectors such as beef, dairy and sugar, far above 50% when expressed in ad valorem 
equivalent (many of the EU tariffs are specific tariffs expressed per tonne or head, litre, etc.).    15
 
However, the idea that the CAP is a prohibitive barrier to the agricultural exports of all 
developing countries needs to be qualified. First, the CAP provides protection and support to 
some products, those that benefit from a protective common market organization, but many 
products of interest to developing countries (those that do not compete with EU production) can 
be imported duty free: tropical fruits, coffee, cocoa, soybean, etc.  
 
Second, many countries can export agricultural products to the EU at a much lower tariff than the 
bound tariff, either under special agreements or under tariff rate quotas. All developing countries 
can export to the EU with reduced tariffs under the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP). 
The coverage of agricultural products of the GSP is limited, and for some products, the 
preferential margin is small. Larger preferences are nevertheless provided to developing countries 
that fight drug trafficking, or that implement measures to protect the environment. African, 
Caribbean and Pacific countries can also export under another non-reciprocal agreement, the 
Cotonou regime, with a larger product coverage and a zero or minimal tariff for many products 
(Table 5). Least Developed Countries can export all agricultural products duty free and quota free 
under a particular component of the GSP, the "Everything But Arms” initiative (with the 
exception of sugar, rice and bananas for a transition period). Some developing countries have also 
signed bilateral agreements with the EU that also provide preferential access (Mediterranean 
countries, South Africa, Chile). As a result of these preferential regimes, the principle of 
"Community preference" of the CAP does not apply to all countries. 
 
Third, even for those products facing high bound tariffs and which are excluded from the GSP 
(for example of sugar and beef, where tariffs exceed 50%), imports with a lower tariff take place 
under tariff rate quotas. However, such quotas are only open for a restricted number of countries. 
 
As a result, EU agricultural protection does not have the same effects on every developing 
country. The protectionist nature of the EU hits hard particularly South American and Asian 
exporters. African countries face a lower tariff because they can export to the EU under more 
generous preferential agreements than, say, Brazil or Thailand. Table 4 shows that the imports 
from sub Saharan Africa and the Caribbean face few tariffs, given the share of exports that are 
subject to low or zero tariffs (coffee, cocoa, etc.) and the preferential regimes such as the Cotonou 
agreement or the GSP.  
 
Most Asian and South American developing countries also face particularly high tariffs for 
processed food products, which encourages the export of raw materials rather than processed 
ones. This issue of tariff escalation is much less severe for sub Saharan African exports to EU 
markets, again because of the existing preferences under the Cotonou or Everything But Arms 
schemes.  
 
These features of the EU tariff structure explain why not all developing countries will gain in the 
same way from a multilateral opening of the EU agricultural market, which is already quite open 
for some of them.  
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Table 5. EU imports of agro-food products under various regimes, year 2002 




Share in total 
imports 
Preferential imports from developing 
countries 
 13  316  20.01% 
  Non reciprocal preferences  0   
    Cotonou  Africa, Caribbean, Pacific  5 500  8.26% 
  GSP  (excluding  Eastern  Europe)  Almost all developing countries  4 257  6.40% 
    GSP "plus" (drugs)   Countries fighting drug trafficking  1 714  2.58% 
    Everything But Arms   Least developed (except Myanmar)  294  0.44% 
  Others  Overseas  territories.  399  0.60% 
  Reciprocal preferences        
  Bilateral  agreements  with  developing 
countries 
Maghreb, Mashrek, etc.  1 153  1.73% 
Imports under a zero MFN duty from 
developing countries 
All developing countries  15 567  23.39% 
Imports under a non zero MFN duty from developing countries 11  724  17.61% 
Total imports from developing countries  40 737  61.20% 
Total EU imports  66 559  100.0% 
Source: Data from Gallezot, based on Taxud and TARIC-Eurostat. Figures for 2002, Chapters 1 to 24 of the 
Harmonized System. GSP indicates the Generalised system of preferences. MFN stands for Most Favoured Nation. 
 
5. Export subsidies 
 
Export subsidies, or "refunds" in EU language, remain an important component of the CAP. 
Renouncing the possibility of subsidising exports would make it difficult to maintain an 
intervention price structurally higher than world prices. However, because of the reforms in 1992 
and 1999, intervention prices have been brought down in most sectors. This has narrowed the gap 
with the world price and has cut the expansion of production, making export subsidies less 
necessary. Export subsidies now amount to 2.6 billion euros (source WTO)
14, while they 
exceeded 10 billion euros in the early 1990s. This figure includes 400 million of export subsidies 
for products "outside Annex 1", which are a compensation for exporters of processed products for 
purchasing EU raw material (sugar and dairy products) at the higher EU price than their 




                                                 
14 The figure for 2004 is 3.4 billion euros for the budget year of the EAGGF 2004. The difference comes 
from a different budget year between the two sources, and the fact that the EU does not notify the reexport 
of the preferential import of sugar as subsidised exports to the WTO. 
15 Annex 1 products can be described as basic products (rice, milk, wheat, meat, cotton, etc.) Non-Annex 1 
products are manufactured goods made up of ingredients which are listed in Annex 1. In such cases, the 
refund is claimed on the ingredient(s) covered by the Annex 1 list.   17
Figure 2. Export refunds 
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Source: EU Commission 
 
Export subsidies face strong criticism from various non governmental organisations. They 
highlight the unfair and harsh competition in some industries: beef and poultry in West Africa, 
milk in Jamaica or in India (Oxfam 2003). These effects are real, especially as the amounts 
concerned can vary considerably from one year to the next according to the quantities which must 
be removed from the European market to support prices. However, the negative consequences for 
developing countries are not uniform. Developing countries which are net importers of food 
benefit from more favorable terms of trade when the EU taxpayer subsidises their imports. 
 
A recent study by Gallezot and Bernard (2004) reviewed the amounts and destinations of 
European export subsidies. It shows that they vary considerably according to the product but also 
to the destination, the main subsidies being granted to dairy products followed by sugar (Table 6). 
Those on beef and poultry now represent only limited quantities. According to this study, 
subsidies are principally aimed at countries that are dependent on imports. This suggests that if 
they compete with local production, they also soften the import bill of the receiving countries, at 
least in the short term. It is difficult, however, to assess the responsibility of these subsidies for 
the inability of local farmers to develop local adequate agricultural production and it is 
undeniable that the subsidies are unfair competition for other potential suppliers.  
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Table 6. EU export refunds 
Product Source Years (Mio Euros)
   1996 1997 1998 1999 2000  2001  2002
 Wheat and wheat flour Feoga 86 210 194 376 403  106  19
 Coarse grains Feoga 227 322 235 507 501  120 77
 Rice   Feoga 33 64 50 30 24 39 24
 Sugar (1) Feoga 1230 116 1370 1593 1439  1008  1168
 Butter and butteroil   Feoga 237 525 337 298 325  336  382
 Skim milk powder   Feoga 138 171 133 196 264 27  35
 Cheese   Feoga 469 272 181 157 213  236  169
 Other milk products   Feoga 761 785 775 788 805  453  498
 Beef meat   Feoga 1559 1499 775 595 661 363 387
 Pigmeat   Feoga 101 72 75 275 263 55  27
 Poultry meat   Feoga 127 71 77 93 73 52  71
 Eggs   Feoga  1 291 4 1 7 1 39   6
 Wine   Feoga 41 60 41 27 22 23 24
 Fruit and vegetables, fresh   Feoga 84 72 41 23 13 15 17
 Fruit and vegetables, processed Feoga 14 13 18 17 13 10  6
 Incorporated products   Feoga 486 566 553 573 572  435  409
 Total  WTO 4885 5566 4362 5337 5613  2764  2576
   Feoga 5674 4887 4906 5605 5604  3287  3319
Excluding sugar exports coming from the ACP countries and India, for which there has been no commitment 
to reduction in the notifications to the WTO but which are counted as an outlay in the FEOGA budget. 
Source FEOGA European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund and WTO. Compilation by J.Gallezot. 
 
 
6. Non tariff issues: standards and regulations 
 
The European Commission makes a strong point claiming that the EU market is particularly open 
to developing countries exports. Indeed, developing countries benefit from significant tariff 
concessions. The Commission stresses that the EU’s record of importing agricultural products 
from developing countries is greater than the USA, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand together. 
The new GSP, which will come into force on 1 January 2006, will grant wide tariff preferences to 
300 additional products mostly in the agriculture and fishery sectors.  
 
However, if tariff concessions are significant, developing countries face other types of obstacles, 
through regulatory issues. Different food scares, following the Bovine Spongiform 
Encephalopathy crisis in the mid 1990s, have put a considerable pressure on EU regulators for 
tighter safety standards. EU authorities responded by creating the European Food Safety Agency, 
and by strengthening regulations regarding microbiological standards and maximum residues 
limits. Recently, for example, standards were tightened on the aflatoxins content of grains and 
fruits, in particular. These standards are so tight that they impose considerable constraints on 
producers, even on European ones. In addition, the change in EU regulations has increased the 
liability of food suppliers in case of health problems. 
 
Although these are not intended to prevent imports, it is a fact that the very high standards 
demanded by EU consumers often make it difficult for developing countries to export agricultural 
and food products to the EU. This is especially true for many higher-value foods, including fruits 
and vegetables, fish, beef, poultry and herbs and spices, for which the challenges of international 
competitiveness have moved well beyond price and basic quality parameters to greater emphasis 
on food safety and animal and plant health concerns. 
 
Because physical inspection at the port of entry was thought to be inadequate to detect many 
newly identified hazards in food, the EU, like many other countries, moved towards certification 
of both products and production processes in the country of origin. In practice, the exporting   19
countries bear additional costs of compliance. Would-be exporters must gain all necessary 
certificates and documents for export through their own efforts. For example, it may be necessary 
for an exporting company to have the certified system of HASSP quality monitoring (Health 
Approved Safety Standards Protection) in place. For some categories of goods, particular 
procedures, such as HACCP (Hazard Analysis at Critical Control Points) are necessary. These 
imply quality control and certification of the whole food chain, which is often a problem for 
developing countries.  
 
Compliance costs cover a range of activities including certification, inspection and analytical 
bodies for countries and a requirement for sophisticated process plant and technical/managerial 
personnel. Cerrex (2003) provides examples of the actual costs required to match EU standards in 
ACP countries. Examples include control and monitoring at a 6 control point HACCP system of 
US$123,000; upgrading fish processing plants at US$6,000 each and certification costs ranging 
up to US$8,000. Overall, these are considerable costs that only a few exporters in developing 
countries can meet. 
 
Box 3. Procedures for exporting to the EU 
 
The Commission is responsible for ensuring that Community legislation on food safety, animal health, 
plant health and animal welfare is properly implemented and enforced. As a Commission service, the Food 
and Veterinary Office (FVO) controls the European Border Inspection Posts (the ports and airports where 
third countries exports are checked before entering the EU and being allowed to trade freely within Europe) 
and approves procedures for third country exports (e.g. ‘first assessment’ or ‘reassessment’ of export 
approvals). 
 
The European Regulations on food safety, plant and animal health are too numerous to be described here. 
As a general example, the process for importing food products of animal origin into the EU involves the 
following steps: 
 
1.  The Competent Authority in the dispatching country contacts the European Commission to request 
approval 
2. The EC visits the country and establishments to check that hygiene standards are equivalent to those in 
the EU 
3. Approval is proposed, accepted or rejected. An updated list of approved countries is published in the 
Official Journal of the European Community and notified to Member States 
4. A Commission Decision is drawn up giving the format for heath certification and a list of approved 
establishments 
5. The Competent Authority in the country of dispatch issues and stamps the health certificate as set out in 
the Commission Decision 
6. Products of animal origin must be imported into the EU through Border Inspection Posts (BIPs) 
7. The importer must notify the BIP of the arrival of consignments (24 hours by sea, 6 hours by air) 
8.  The Official Veterinary Surgeon (or Official Fish Inspector - for fishery products) carries out a : 
 a. Document check;  b. Identity check;  c. Physical check 
If the checks are satisfactory, a Common Veterinary Entry Document (CVED) is issued for that 
consignment of goods: it can then be imported into the EU. If the consignment fails the checks then it must 
be either re-exported or destroyed. 
 
Source : UK Food Safety Agency, http://www.food.gov.uk/multimedia/pdfs/import_poao.pdf  
 
Traceability regulations have potentially adverse consequences for developing country exporters, 
because it places the onus of proof on the private sector and lays open company heads from both 
the EU production and import sectors to criminal sanctions. The threat of very large fines means 
that the major organisations involved in European distribution place increased pressure on their   20
suppliers to provide all guarantees of traceability and food safety for fresh fruit and vegetables. 
Many developing countries exporters are not equipped to supply the amount of information 
required. 
 
In addition, beyond the difficulties arising from the recognition of their own standards by the EU, 
developing countries also face the problem of ‘voluntary certifications’ which are becoming more 
and more a prerequisite for European retailers.  
 
7. The pressures for further reform of the CAP 
 
7.1. The EU budget 
 
In December 2002, the European Council fixed the budget ceiling of the CAP’s "first pillar" – 
direct payments and market measures – until 2013. In brief, the budget will be frozen in nominal 
terms, while the payments to the EU 10 new members will be progressively phased in. This 
ensures a continuation of the CAP up to this horizon, even though support to individual farmers 
will go down in real terms, especially if the EU is enlarged to Romania and Bulgaria as expected 
in 2007 and CAP expenditure in these countries must be included within this budget ceiling. 
 
 However, in spite of the agreement on this ceiling there is so far (September 2005) no 
consensus regarding an overall financial package from 2007 to 2013, and there are 
pressures, particularly in the United Kingdom, for cutting the CAP budget agreed upon in 
2002. While it is unlikely that large cuts will take place in the near future, an assessment 
of the past reform scheduled to take place in 2008/2009 could trigger further reforms. It is 
likely that these reforms will press for a  reduction in the CAP budget, given the need to 
fund other European priorities such as research and education. After 2013, it is possible 
that the CAP could be reduced dramatically, as demanded by the United Kingdom as well 
as a few other member states.  
 
There is now a club of countries willing to cap the EU budget and freeze their 
contributions (the EU budget is funded by different sources, including custom tariffs and 
a contribution based on the gross national income of each member country). In particular, 
the group of countries that benefit less from the CAP, because of their net food import 
position, or because they specialize in products that receive little support, are increasingly 
reluctant to maintain agricultural expenditure at the present (high) percentage of the EU 
budget. Figure 3 shows the relative budget positions of the old Member States of the 
EU15 in 2003, expressed as a per cent of their gross national income; just four countries 
(Spain, Ireland, Greece and Portugal) emerge as net beneficiaries, with all other countries 
net contributors. With the addition of ten new Member States, all of whom will be net 
beneficiaries from the EU budget, the position of the net contributor Member States will 
further disimprove. Discussion of the financial package for 2007-2013 is made more 
difficult by the terms of a special deal with the UK which limits the size of its overall net 
contribution, even though its per capita income is now higher than other Member States 
which make larger net contributions. An agreement is not now expected until Spring 
2006 and thus the outlook for CAP direct payments will not be know until then. 
  
 





7.2. EU enlargement  
 
Ten new members joined the European Union in 2004. Many analysts feared for the 
consequences for the CAP, given the large number of farmers in countries such as Poland (and 
Romania, scheduled to joined in 2007). It was predicted that, given the production potential of 
these countries, when farmers would face higher EU prices, production would increase 
considerably, jeopardizing the common market organizations. Indeed, numerically, enlargement’s 
impact on EU agriculture added 4 million farmers to the EU’s existing population of 7 million. 
The new Member States also added about 38 million hectares of utilised agricultural area to the 
130 million hectares of the 15 States, an increase of 30%, while production in the EU expanded 
by about 10 - 20% for most products.  
 
It is too early to be conclusive on the actual impact of the enlargement on EU production and, 
indirectly on the common market organisations. The direct payments will be phased in 
progressively in the 10 new members, and it is only in 2013 that these will be fully aligned with 
those of the EU15. However, the prospect of building large surplus in the future has played a role 
in the decrease in intervention prices under the Agenda 2000 and in the decoupling of the direct 
payments in 2003. In the future, the enlargement could modify the orientation of the CAP. While 
some of the new members are likely to benefit from the CAP, nothing in their recent positions 
indicates that they will strongly argue for larger funding of the CAP.  
 
7.3. The need for a greener CAP 
 
Pressures from the public opinion are increasingly calling for a more environmentally-friendly, 
greener CAP. The environmental balance of the CAP is particularly controversial. The 
maintenance of an agricultural population and farm production in some marginal rural areas 
contributes to some positive externalities. For example, it has been shown that biodiversity is 
often greater in "open spaces" including some agriculture than in forests or abandoned land, and 
the maintenance of a combination of livestock and crops is a positive externality that has been   22
shown to be valued by citizens and tourists (Mahé and Ortalo-Magné 2002). Agriculture still 
plays a significant role in the process of economic and social cohesion in certain rural regions. 
Even as a minority in the countryside, farmers are still the main managers of the land. 
Agricultural practices largely determine the degree of attractiveness of these regions, particularly 
where the landscape is concerned.  
 
In Europe, these positive links between agriculture and the environment and rural development 
have been promoted as evidence of the multifunctionality of agriculture in post-industrial 
societies. Agriculture remains important as a producer of food and raw materials, but it also 
contributes in other ways to protect the environment, preserve rural landscapes and contribute to 
the socio-economic development of rural regions. Agriculture is seen as multifunctional because 
it is not limited to the sole function of producing food and fibre but also fulfils these various other 
functions. What is characteristic for these other functions is that they have mainly a public good 
character, that is, these services cannot be bought and sold in a private marketplace. To secure the 
continued availability of these services, farm lobbies and other interest groups argue that public 
intervention to support the continued survival of farming is justified, even where agriculture 
cannot compete solely in terms of the value of food production alone. 
 
However, the CAP has long provided an incentive to increase production, and therefore use 
chemical inputs. As a result, in a country like France, more than two thirds of surface water 
exceed maximum limits for nitrates, and close to 80% of groundwater is tainted by pesticides. 
Agriculture uses more than two thirds of the final consumption of water. In addition, the CAP has 
often encouraged intensive farming and is said by the French National Institute for Environment 
(IFEN) to be responsible of one third of the endangered species among vertebrates. In 10 years, 
some 740 000 hectares of permanent pastures have disappeared, often replaced by other types of 
fodder, such as silage corn. The problem is similar in most EU countries, as shown by the 
European Court of Auditors, which published a very severe evaluation of the environmental 
impacts of the CAP (ECA 2000). 
 
The 1992 reform introduced some agri-environmental payments in order to provide incentives for 
farmers to supply amenities, or at least to stop destroying natural resources. These payments were 
very limited, and, for example, the payment for maintaining permanent pastures was much 
smaller than the payments that could be obtained for less environmental friendly production. The 
Agenda 2000 and the June 2003 reforms have gone further in shifting some of the payments 
towards the provision of environmental goods. The environmental dimension of the various 
common market organizations was strengthened. The beef premia were made conditional on 
tighter maximum stocking rates and the set aside of land for conservation purposes was 
encouraged. The 2003 reform put more emphasis on the compliance with good environmental 
practices. All farmers receiving direct payments will now be subject to "cross compliance". A list 
of 18 statutory European standards in the field of environment, animal health and welfare has 
been established and farmers will be sanctioned for non-respect of these standards through cuts in 
the Single Farm Payment.  
 
The rebalancing of the CAP budget towards the provision of amenities is still only very partial. 
Only some 15% of overall CAP expenditure can be considered as directed to environmental or 
rural development purposes. Because of the growing demands of citizens for cleaner surface and 
groundwater, and because of the recurrent problems of water supply, it is likely that there will be 
more pressure in the future to move towards the remuneration of genuine positive externalities. In 
addition, environmental payments (and the "second pillar" in general) are not subject to the same 
budget discipline as the "first pillar". In the area of environment, national governments also have 
much more flexibility for granting their own domestic aids than under the traditional CAP (the   23
Rome Treaty limits considerably national payments and policies that could distort competition 
within the single market). Given the pressure for cutting the CAP budget, it is possible that, in the 
future, some budget (from Community and domestic origin) will de facto shift towards the second 
pillar. 
 
7.4. International pressures: preferential agreements 
 
The international environment has been a driving force for changes in the CAP since the 1992 
reform, with the aim (among others) of improving the EU position within the WTO negotiations. 
Preferential agreements have recently played a significant role in the reform of some common 
market organisations, even though agricultural products are often excluded from EU regional and 
bilateral trade agreements.  
 
In 2001, the EU adopted the "Everything But Arms" initiative (EBA) as part of its General 
System of Preferences for Least Developed Countries. The EBA grants duty free and quota free 
access for all agricultural products, starting in 2001 for most products, but in 2009 for sugar 
(quotas are implemented to smooth the transition). Many Least Developed Countries are net 
importers of sugar, but some of them have a significant export potential, and already attract 
foreign investment in this sector. Several millions of tonnes of sugar could start entering the EU 
from 2009 onwards under the Everything But Arms agreement, especially if Least Developed 
Countries begin to export not just their surplus production but all domestic production while re-
importing cheaper supplies from the world market for domestic consumption (known as 
triangular trade). This prospect has been important in triggering a reform of the EU sugar sector, 
which should involve a decrease in intervention prices (the Commission made successive 
proposals in July 2004 and June 2005 and it is hoped agreement will be reached by November 
2005).  
 
In the future, the prospect of a free(er) trade agreement between the EU and Mercosur (Brazil, 
Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay) could be a driving force for further reforms. Such an 
agreement has been discussed since 1995, but negotiations have not succeeded so far, in spite of 
the offer of significant tariff rate quotas by the EU in 2003. Mercosur countries demand a larger 
(quota free) market access for agricultural products. The potential EU exports of manufactured 
products and services to Mercosur are such that the EU could make larger concessions in the 
agricultural area in exchange for concessions in the services sector should the negotiations be 
finally concluded. In such a case, the production potential of Mercosur in sugar, ethanol (Brazil), 
beef (Brazil and Argentina), cheese (Argentina), poultry and pigmeat is such that extra reforms of 
the CAP could be necessary. 
 
The so-called Barcelona process aims at liberalising trade between countries around the 
Mediterranean.
16 A series of bilateral agreements has been concluded, completing some 
agreements dating back from the 1970s. However, agricultural products are largely excluded from 
these agreements, and when they are included, they are most of the time subject to quotas. 
Southern EU countries fear an ambitious liberalisation in the fruit and vegetable markets, which 
is one of the main demands by North African and Middle East countries. This has so far been an 
obstacle to the full inclusion of the agricultural sector in the process. However, there is a strong 
                                                 
16 The Barcelona process is an ongoing cooperation process between the EU and the other countries of the 
Mediterranean area. It includes some trade provisions, as well as assistance and stabilisation programmes. 
Under the trade provisions, however, tariffs have been reduced only for a limited number of products. EU 
producers fear the competition of North African producers in some sensitive areas such as fruits and 
vegetables.    24
political willingness to develop economic cooperation with Maghreb and Mashrek countries, for 
geopolitical reasons. In addition, these countries are a potential market for some agricultural 
products (cereal, potatoes, etc), so that there are conflicting interests between EU members on the 
concessions that should be granted in the fruits and vegetables sector. Finally, the conclusion of a 
free trade agreement between Morocco and the United States in 2004 has been seen as a warning 
that Maghreb countries are getting impatient regarding the lack of extension of their access to the 
EU market. In spite of the opposition of some EU members, it is possible that the political 
willingness to go forward in developing economic interactions with these countries could be a 
driving force for a reform of the EU fruits and vegetables sector, scheduled in 2006. 
 
The Cotonou Agreement is a comprehensive aid and trade agreement concluded between 77 ACP 
(African, Caribbean and Pacific) countries and the European Union, signed in June 2000 in 
Cotonou (Benin). The Cotonou Agreement builds on former ACP-EU cooperation (the Yaoundé 
and Lomé agreements), and includes economic and trade co-operation as well as aid. Under the 
four successive Lomé conventions (1975-2000), the EU granted a preferential trade regime to 
ACP countries through trade preferences, commodity protocols and other instruments of trade co-
operation as well as financial and technical aid. Under Cotonou, the current non-reciprocal tariff 
preferences will be maintained until 31st December 2007 under the terms of a WTO waiver from 
its rules governing non-discriminatory treatment of third countries. Starting from 2008, a set of 
reciprocal Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) will replace them, following negotiations 
that began in September 2002. 
 
The EU operates on the assumption that the EPA negotiations will be concluded on a regional 
basis, with those regions which have functioning regional integration processes and mechanisms. 
The ACP-EU negotiations are supposed to yield EPAs that would be development oriented, free 
trade areas and WTO compatible, meaning that the ACP countries would also have to open their 
borders to "substantially all" EU exports. Those countries that do not wish to open their markets 
to EU products after 2008 can choose to revert to the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) 
regime. Because the ACP countries include both Least Developed Countries and non-LDCs, 
some of them can benefit from the Everything But Arms (EBA) while others cannot.  
 
The concern is that, given the bilateral nature of the EPAs (rather than the non-reciprocal Lomé 
regime), some industries in the ACP countries would suffer from the competition of EU exports 
(chicken, tomato industries in Ghana and Senegal, milling industry in other countries). While it is 
unlikely that the EPAs will lead to a much larger opening of the EU market to ACP products than 
the previous arrangements, there will be pressure on the EU to offer some concessions to offset 
the opening up of ACP economies to its exports, and this will further add to  the pressures to 
reform the CAP. 
 
7.5. International pressures: the WTO 
 
Multilateral negotiations have obviously been a major driving force for CAP reforms since the 
Uruguay Round. The main constraint imposed by the WTO discipline on the CAP has perhaps 
been the commitments limiting export subsidies. At the end of the 1990s, the prospect of piling 
up surpluses that could no longer be exported because of the ceilings on subsidised exports was 
the main motivation for lowering intervention prices under the Agenda 2000. More recently, the 
prospect that the exemption from reduction commitments for "blue box" types of support would 
be difficult to defend under the Doha Round was among the factors that led the Commission to 
push for an ambitious decoupling of direct payments from production in 2003. 
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The dispute settlement procedure under the WTO adds some extra pressure to CAP reform. In the 
case of sugar, the EU lost a WTO panel requested by Australia, Brazil and Thailand in 2005. The 
decision of the Appellate Body effectively requires a cut back of sugar exports by 4.6 million 
tonnes. This outcome takes away an important safety valve for releasing pressure from the 
domestic EU sugar market, and presses for an ambitious reform of the sugar sector. In addition, 
some uncertainty surrounds the compatibility of the Single Farm Payment with the WTO rules for 
eligibility for the "green box", in particular because of the jurisprudence created by the WTO 
dispute on cotton (Brazil-United States). Because of some restrictions introduced in order benefit 
from payments, some US subsidies were considered as market distorting. It remains to be seen 
whether the EU conditions about maintaining land in good agricultural conditions, or the 
restrictions regarding the planting of certain horticultural crops or protecting the area under 
pasture, could allow third countries to challenge the exemptions of the SFP from reduction 
commitments, i.e. its exclusion from the AMS (EU farmers have flexibility as to what they can 
produce but with the exception of explicitly excluded commodities such as fruits and vegetables). 
 
7.6. The political economy of further reform 
 
While there is a lot of debate within the EU regarding the external constraints imposing changes 
in the CAP (namely the WTO one), the major driving force for a CAP reform is likely to be 
domestic. The CAP budget, roughly 0.5 percent of the EU GDP, is not particularly "excessive" 
for the only policy that is a genuinely common one at European level. However, there is a 
growing feeling that the amount of money spent on agriculture would be better spent in other 
sectors, such as a common policy for research and innovation, or perhaps defence and foreign 
country assistance. In addition, criticisms are raising about the distribution of the CAP benefits, 
now that the shift to direct payments makes more visible that subsidies mainly benefit a minority 
of relatively well-off farmers (50% of the budget for direct payments go to only 7% of the 
beneficiaries, according to a 2002 study by the European Commission. OECD figures, which 
account for market price support, show an even higher degree of concentration of the benefits).  
 
The large budget allocated to the CAP has long been the result of political compromises. Some 
support was sometimes granted to particular products such as cotton, olive oil or fruits and 
vegetables, as a way of reaching political deals with particular countries in a peculiar decision 
making process where a few key countries can decide votes on specific issues. This political 
economy process also explains the persistence of the large payments for arable crop farmers, 
which were originally intended to compensate for price cuts in 1993 and 2000, but were extended 
until 2013. These payments benefit particularly some countries whose weight was determinant in 
the decision making process. The same thing can be said about the sugar regime, which has been 
more or less unreformed since 1969, also because of powerful vested interests. However, some of 
these obstacles to changes are now being eroded. The enlargement to 10 new members is 
modifying the rents that countries obtained regarding the distribution of structural funds. This 
modifies the overall distribution of benefits of the common policies, in which the CAP implicitly 
plays a large role. The shift towards more payments for the "second pillar" could lead to a 
renationalisation of the CAP, the countries most attached to subsidising their farmers being 
invited to do so at their own budget cost. 
 
The major change is perhaps the erosion of the political strength of the farm interest groups. Bad 
management of their political capital of sympathy, and attacks from environmentalists, non 
governmental development organizations and consumer groups have changed the perception of 
farmers by the public in some countries where they used to find strong support. In the media, and 
to some extent in public opinion, the CAP is now more and more seen as a policy that encourages   26
pollution, and that participates in impoverishing developing countries.
17 The majority of public 
opinion, as measured by Eurobarometer surveys, is in favour of subsidising less agricultural 
production and subsidising more the environment. These trends in public opinion suggest that, in 
the next few years, the CAP could be under increased scrutiny and its funding subject to 
increasing controversy.  
 
8. What are the effects of the CAP on developing countries? 
 
8.1. The overall impact of the CAP 
 
Non governmental organizations have been particularly vociferous when denouncing the negative 
effects of the CAP on developing countries (Oxfam 2005). They argue that the EU continues to 
dump surplus production on world markets and that subsidized exports competing unfairly with 
local production drive producers out of business; that EU tariffs prevent developing countries 
exporting agricultural products; and that the move towards decoupled payments has been mainly 
cosmetic, given that huge subsidies still provide EU farmers an incentive to produce and therefore 
compete unfairly with developing countries which do not have such financial means to support 
their farm sector. 
 
Not all economists share this point of view. Recently, for example, Panagariya (2005) has 
claimed that most of the analysis of the NGOs relied on a series of fallacies, and that the 
agricultural policies of developed countries had, overall, little negative impact on developing 
countries: in some cases, the removal of these policies would even have significant negative 
consequences for developed countries, for example by leading to a degradation of their terms of 
trade. 
 
In practice, what are the overall effects of the CAP on developing countries?
18 First, these effects 
appear very contrasted across countries. By encouraging agricultural production in the EU, the 
CAP clearly hurts some developing countries that are net exporters and that would, otherwise, 
supply a larger share of the EU or world market. However, the situation is less clear for net food 
importing developing countries.  
 
Second, the distortions on world market generated by the CAP are now much smaller that the 
ones that resulted from the CAP in the 1980s, because of the reforms that have taken place. Third, 
the reforms of the CAP have gone together with an improvement of market access, even though 
this access remains very uneven across commodities and across would-be exporters. 
 
The effect of domestic support. Because of the reforms that have taken place since 1992, support 
to farmers in the EU now mainly takes the form of direct payments, which rely on historical 
entitlements and have therefore less impact on production than they had before. Decoupled 
payments are much less distorting than the former market price support and output subsidies. 
However, in the EU the decoupling is only partial, and the new Single Farm Payment remains 
conditional on the maintenance of the land in good agricultural condition, even though it does not 
require actual production. More generally, payments are only truly "decoupled" if the capital 
                                                 
17 The evolution of public opinion, as measured by Eurobarometer surveys, is contrasted across countries. It 
does not globally show that the perception of the CAP is more and more negative. However, the 
enlargement has modified considerably the results for the EU as a whole, and the Eurobarometer survey 
contains questions that stress the positive role of the CAP in food safety and consumer protection, more 
than questions that open the door to criticisms of the CAP. 
18 For a fuller discussion of this topic, see Bureau, Jean and Matthews (2005).   27
market is perfect, and if private consumption decisions are separable from the production side of 
the household. Economy theory suggests that to give a sum of money, even unconditionally, to a 
farmer necessarily influences the amount produced. In reducing the risk of insolvency, even 
decoupled payments encourage higher production or riskier cultivation. There is often an implicit 
anticipation that cultivated areas will be used as a reference in the next reform which keeps land 
in cultivation. 
 
Developing countries complain about the indirect distortions generated by "decoupled payments". 
There are few solid quantitative results on the effect of such aid on production. A recent study by 
Abler and Blandford (2005) suggests that the effects on the quantities produced are limited. Their 
survey of the econometric results in the literature suggests that developing countries can expect 
only small gains even from a large reduction in these direct payments. However, this conclusion 
is subject to uncertainty regarding the proper way to model these payments, which parallels the 
imperfect knowledge of their economic impact (Gohin 2005). It remains to be seen whether the 
SFP will actually lead to an observable decrease in yields, or a diminution of EU production. If it 
is not the case, this could mean that, indeed, the shift towards more decoupled payments will have 
introduced only minor changes in the distortions that the CAP brought to world markets. 
 
The effect of border protection. The EU is still reluctant to lower tariffs for the agricultural 
products that benefit from a common market organisation, since they are necessary for 
maintaining the whole intervention system.  
 
Because of the large number of developing countries that benefit from preferences, the impact of 
the border protection component of the CAP is very uneven. Basically, the developing countries 
that benefit only from the regular GSP obtain a very limited access to the EU market in sectors 
such as beef, dairy and sugar, which are not (or only very partially) covered by the preferences. 
The countries that benefit from the Cotonou Agreement or the "GSP plus" have a larger market 
access, and higher preferential margins. Least developed countries will soon face no tariffs or 
quotas, because of the future full opening of the banana, rice and sugar sectors. 
 
In practice, simulations suggest that the removal of EU agricultural tariffs would have some 
positive consequences on Latin American and some East Asian exporters, such as Brazil and 
Thailand. However, simulations also suggest that the erosion of preferential access and the 
preferential rents would lead to negative consequences in sub-Saharan Africa, and even more in 
the Caribbean (Bouët et al 2005; Laird et al 2004). 
 
The effect of export subsidies. There is little evidence of the impact of EU export subsidies on 
the economies of developing countries, except for some anecdotal cases highlighted by non 
governmental organisations. Overall, it is likely that EU subsidized exports have distorted 
competition with local producers in particular sectors and in particular locations (the subsidies to 
beef exports to West Africa have sometimes represented half the cargo value).  
 
Nevertheless, the impact of EU export subsidies on world prices seems small, except in the case 
of sugar and dairy products, according to the work by Bouët et al (2004). The scheduled 
elimination of EU export subsidies is unlikely to alter significantly the market conditions for 
developing countries. It will hardly have any impact on those developing countries which sell 
their sugar higher than the world price in the framework of preferential quotas. With dairy 
produce, only some developing countries like Argentina have a definite comparative advantage. 
Subsidised exports of milk affect essentially West Africa, which historically does not have 
significant production potential. In short, the removal of such subsidies is desirable to end unfair 
competition, but the overall negative effect of export subsidies on developing countries has been   28
overestimated by non governmental organizations, at least as far as their impact on poorest 
countries is concerned (Oxfam 2005). EU export subsidies seem mainly to drag down the world 
price of the exports of a few major exporters such as Brazil (sugar) and Argentina (dairy 
products). 
 
8.2. A focus on a few commodities 
 
Rice. Rice producers are now eligible for the Single Farm Payment. However, in order to 
preserve certain traditional production areas, producers also receive aid for rice set on the basis of 
yield for a maximum guaranteed area in each Member State. This area varies depending on 
whether or not the Member State opts to make use of the transitional period. If the area is 
exceeded, the aid is reduced proportionately.
19 In addition, the production of rice remains 
supported by an intervention price, which now amounts to 150 Euro per tonne for paddy rice (rice 
which has retained its husk after threshing).
20  Rice imports are subject to import duty ceilings 
linked to the intervention price. Reducing the intervention price has the effect of also reducing 
applied tariff rate which can be applied to imported rice. 
 
The reform should therefore make the production of rice less attractive than the previous regime, 
which relied on a higher intervention price (298 Euro per tonne) and compensatory payments. 
Full liberalisation of rice access for Least Developed Countries will be phased in by September 
2009 by gradually reducing the full EU tariff to zero. In the meantime, their rice can enter duty 
free within the limits of tariff rate quotas, increasing annually to reach 6 700 tonnes in 2008/2009. 
Once the quota restrictions are removed, it is very likely that rice imports from Least Developed 
Countries will put downward pressure on milled rice prices within the EU. Because the paddy 
rice price would remain supported, it was feared that this would lead to an unacceptable build up 
in intervention stocks. For that reason, the intervention purchases of rice will be limited to 75 000 
tonnes of rice in the future. That is, overall, the combination of the reform decided in 2003, which 
involves a reduction in intervention price and indirectly a reduction in tariffs, and the Everything 
But Arms provisions should open significantly the EU market to developing countries in the 
future, particularly to LDC exports. 
 
Cotton. The EU, with 708 000 tons of imports and 227 000 tons of exported ginned cotton, is the 
major net importer on the world scene, but its production nevertheless reaches 1.55 million tons 
of raw cotton. The cotton sector is concentrated in some regions of Greece (79% of the total EU 
production ) where cotton contributes 9% of its final agricultural output while in Spain, the other 
main EU producer, cotton contributes 1%. Production in other Member States (only in Portugal) 
is less than 1 500 tonnes.  
 
The EU cotton regime, which dates from Greek accession in 1981, was modified in 2001, in order 
to tighten budget discipline and limit the total area dedicated to intensive cotton production, 
                                                 
19  After the 2003 reform, all farmers may apply for direct payments, which are independent of their 
production and supplementary to their income. Specific support schemes have nevertheless been introduced 
for durum wheat, protein crops, rice, nuts, energy crops, starch potatoes, milk products, seeds, arable crops, 
sheepmeat and goatmeat, beef and veal, grain legumes, cotton, tobacco, hops, as well as for farmers 
maintaining olive groves. 
20 From 1 April to 31 July of each year, the intervention agencies can buy in quantities of rice offered for 
intervention up to a maximum of 75 000 tonnes (100 000 tonnes for the period from 1 April to 31 July 
2004). If the quality of paddy rice offered for intervention differs from the standard quality for which the 
intervention price was fixed, price increases or reductions are applied. The intervention agencies can 
subsequently offer rice in storage for sale on the Community market or for export to third countries.   29
associated with environmental problems. The reform of agricultural aid for cotton (as well as, 
tobacco, hops and olive oil and table olives) was negotiated together and included in the same 
Regulation in what was known as the "Mediterranean package". All these products were 
subsequently included (April 2004) in the comprehensive reform of the common agricultural 
policy (CAP) of June 2003, with the approval of the move from direct aid (aid paid by hectare, 
unit of output or livestock unit) to a system of single farm payments. 
 
The decoupling of support was only partial in the case of cotton, with only a proportion of the aid 
moving to a system of single farm payments. That is, 35% of aid will continue to be provided in 
the form of an area payment (direct aid), with the remaining 65% being provided as a single farm 
payment. The objective was to protect certain areas in which production would cease if 
decoupling was fully applied. Under the previous arrangements, growers did not benefit from 
direct aid for cotton but rather from indirect aid paid to ginners. The total aid available per hectare 
in each Member State is fixed at 35% of the national allocation that producers received indirectly. 
Aid is subject to a maximum eligible area (370 000 ha in Greece and 70 000 ha in Spain). 
 
EU tariffs on cotton are low in the EU (raw cotton and yarns enter duty free). The domestic 
support provided to Greek and Spanish farmers are the major forces that enhance supply and 
therefore restrict imports. Even though the decoupling has been partial, it should provide less 
incentive to produce. Environmental constraints are also likely to curb intensive production in 
Greece, as will water supply problems in Spain. The EU market could increase for would-be 
exporters. However, the competition from subsidised US cotton, and the growing competition 
from countries such as China and Brazil, could limit the benefits for other developing countries. 
 
Tobacco. Like cotton, tobacco was reformed under rules known as the Mediterranean package in 
2004. Those products were included in the major June 2003 reform framework when the switch 
from direct support to the single farm payment was approved. The common organisation of the 
market in raw tobacco has been fundamentally changed in order to switch over completely to the 
single-farm-payment system by means of decoupling starting in 2006. Decoupling will apply in 
full from 2010, but Member States may opt for a four-year transitional period starting in 2006. 
During that period, at least 40% of direct aid for tobacco under the old system will be allocated to 
single farm payments. The (at most) 60% remaining may continue during the transitional period 
(2006-10) as production aid for raw-tobacco growers, including in Objective 1 regions (whose 
development is lagging behind) or for those growing varieties of a specific quality. There is a 
ceiling to the coupled aid for each Member State in 2006-09, with maximum aid being some 227 
million euros in Greece and 200 million euros in Italy, 71 million euros in Spain and 48 million 
euros in France. 
 
Bananas. The common organisation of the market in bananas has been altered to prepare for its 
switch, from 1 January 2006, to a tariff-only system, and for the EU enlargement in 2004. 
Domestic assistance includes support to encourage the setting up of producer organisations 
recognised by the Member States which promote the production and marketing of the products 
concerned (granted for a period of five years). Associations of producers and individual producers 
who are unable to participate in a producer group on account of their geographical remoteness 
may receive compensation. The guaranteed Community quantity for which compensation may be 
claimed is 854 000 tonnes allocated among the producer regions (Canary Islands, Guadeloupe, 
Martinique, Madeira, Crete, Algarve and Lakonia). A guaranteed quantity of 13 500 tonnes has 
been granted to Cyprus in the accession negotiations. The Commission determines the amount of 
the compensation each year.  
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Since 1 January 2002, the following three tariff quotas have been applicable: Quota A: 2 200 000 
tons at the rate of EUR 75/tonne. (ACP bananas - African, Caribbean and Pacific countries - are 
zero-rated); Quota B: 453 000 tons at the rate of EUR 75/tonne (ACP bananas are zero-rated); 
Quota C: 750 000 tons at the rate of zero euro/ton (reserved for ACP bananas). A and B quotas 
are opened for bananas of any origin, while the C quota is reserved for the ACP States. Imports of 
non-quota bananas are subject to customs duty of EUR 680/tonne, save for the ACP countries 
which qualify for a tariff preference of EUR 300/tonne. The Commission, under an agreement 
concluded within the WTO, allocated A and B tariff quotas among the main supplier countries 
with the agreement of the latter. Furthermore, the new Regulation provides for the import of an 
additional volume of 300 000 tons of bananas from 1 May up to 31 December 2004, taking into 
account EU enlargement. Tariff quotas may be granted on the basis of a traditional/newcomers 
method and/or other methods. The method currently adopted following agreement with the 
United States (main distributor country) and Ecuador (one of the main producer countries) is that 
of historical reference quantities which takes account of the need to ensure balance in supply to 
the Community market. 
 
A common tariff per tonne will apply to imports of fresh bananas from 1 January 2006. After this 
date the market organisation for bananas will switch to a tariff-only system. The level of the tariff 
continues to be disputed by Latin American exporters and, following WTO arbitration, the 
Commission put forward a revised banana tariff proposal in September 2005. This reform is 
likely to lead to result of a significant reorientation of trade, towards imports originating from 
lower costs producers, in particular Central America. 
 
Sugar. The ongoing reform of the sugar sector is certainly the one that could have the largest 
consequences for developing countries.
21 The EU is a major sugar exporter although it also 
absorbs a significant amount of sugar imports under preferential agreements with developing 
countries. However, sugar production in the EU is highly supported, so sugar exports can only 
take place with the aid of export subsidies. The volume of subsidised sugar exports is now 
constrained by the EU’s commitment limits under the WTO Agriculture Agreement.  
 
Several factors have contributed to the need for the EU to reform its sugar regime. The 
Everything But Arms agreement opens the EU to increases in sugar imports from least developed 
countries. Because the EU is more than self-sufficient in sugar, any increase in imports will 
require a one-for-one reduction in domestic EU production if the EU is to remain within its export 
subsidy limits. This pressure will be exacerbated by a successful outcome of the Doha Round if it 
requires the eventual elimination of all subsidised exports. Furthermore, the EU under the WTO 
Agriculture Agreement had not declared as subsidised exports either so-called ‘C’ sugar (surplus 
sugar production exported without the aid of formal export subsidies) or an amount of subsidised 
exports equal to the volume of imports from ACP countries and India under the sugar protocol of 
the Cotonou Agreement. However, a WTO panel in a dispute brought by Australia, Thailand and 
Brazil concluded that C sugar exports should be included under export subsidy limits as should 
the subsidised exports equivalent to the volume imported under the ACP protocol. To comply 
with this ruling requires a further reduction in domestic EU production. Finally, the Doha Round 
negotiations are also addressing the issue of high tariffs which reduce market access. Any 
agreement to reduce tariffs and/or to restrict the use of the special safeguard measure would 
compromise the ability of the EU to retain the high internal sugar price. 
 
In response to these pressures, the EU Commission put forward a reform proposal in July 2004, 
which was revised in the light of Member State reactions and the outcome of the WTO dispute in 
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June 2005. The main elements are summarised and compared in Box 4. It is planned that the 
reform will be agreed in November 2005. 
 
Because of the reform, the price at which preferential imports of sugar are purchased from ACP 
countries and India, as well as from the least developed countries under the EBA agreement, will 
be lowered. This will result in an erosion of the rents these countries receive, which for some 
countries account for a large share of their economies (for example, the rent from preferential 
sugar exports to the EU accounts for up to 9% of the GDP in Guyana). Some of these countries 
may be competitive exporters to the world market, and may benefit from alternative market 
opportunities if the Doha Round results in a greater market access for sugar exporters (something 
which may not happen if sugar is treated as a sensitive product by the main importers). For other 





Box 4. The forthcoming sugar reform 
 
Talks about sugar reform have lasted for years, until a detailed proposal in 2004 by the EU Commission. 
After discussions and in order to account for new international developments, such as the WTO panel on 
the exports of EU sugar, new Commission proposals for reform of the EU sugar sector were released in 
June 2005. The proposals tabled deal with: 
 
● the introduction of direct aid payments to EU sugar farmers and the incorporation of such payments into 
the single farm payment scheme;  
● reduction in the administratively determined prices set in the sugar sector;  
● reform of the production-quota management system;  
● restructuring aid for enterprises wishing to leave the sugar sector;  
● the regulation of imports and exports;  
● the uses of sugar in the chemical, pharmaceutical and bio-fuels sectors.  
 
Of most importance to developing countries is the phased reduction of the raw sugar price over a 4-year 
period beginning in 2006. This would bring the price down to €319.5 per tonne from the 2009/10 season 
onwards. This would result in a significant erosion of the value of preferences. Although some adjustment 
measures are included in the reform, there are worries regarding the speed of the reform and the lack of 
time for adjustment in the ACP countries that benefit from the Cotonou agreement sugar protocol. 
However, competing sugar exporters, mainly Brazil but possibly also including some low-cost ACP 




Fruits and vegetables. The fruit and vegetable reform, scheduled to take place after 2005, could 
ease access to the EU market for developing countries. Presently, the CAP protects the EU fruits 
and vegetable sector with a complex system of tariffs, which de facto impose a minimum entry 
price. Tariffs are high during the months when the EU production is marketed. Mediterranean 
countries, whose production is mainly exported during these particular months could be a winner. 
Exports of fresh vegetables from sub-Saharan Africa could also be made easier by a reform of the 
EU system.  
 
 
                                                 
22 Further discussion of the EU sugar reform and its implications for developing countries can be found in 
Chaplin and Matthews (2005a, 2005b).   32
9. Conclusion 
 
The purpose of this paper was to describe the operation of the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy 
and the background to the reforms underway – the factors making for change and the extent of 
change – from a developing country perspective. The paper presents a positive evaluation of the 
reforms which have taken place over the past decade: market price support has been reduced; 
most direct payments will be decoupled from 2005 onwards; preferential treatment for some 
developing countries and some commodities has improved market access; dependence on export 
subsidies has fallen. Nonetheless, tariff peaks remain for many agricultural products and the CAP 
still presents a barrier to developing country exports, not least for meat, sugar, dairy products and 
fruits and vegetables.  
 
Longer term reform of the CAP is likely to continue the trend towards a reduction of farm 
support, and a reorientation of the CAP budget towards the second pillar. What is at issue is more 
the pace rather than the direction of reform. This should lead to even lower levels of trade-
distorting agricultural support. But because major changes have already taken place in the CAP, 
the resulting impact on world prices will be small. The progressive decoupling of the farm 
support should lower production, but agricultural output is likely to rise more than consumption 
in the 10 new Member States.  
 
A successful conclusion to the Doha Round of WTO negotiations could lead to significant cuts in 
the highest EU agricultural tariffs, depending on the treatment of sensitive products. Competitive 
middle-income exporters will gain from improved market access. However, some developing 
countries (ACP, Least Developed Countries) which are presently heavily dependent on agri-food 
exports to the EU exported under preferences are likely to suffer, because of extra competition 
from Australia, Brazil and Thailand. Lower market prices in the EU (whether driven by internal 
reform or WTO/preferential trade agreements) will also lower the benefits of preferential market 
access in the future.  
 
However, as tariff barriers fall, market access is becoming increasingly dependent on quality 
assurance and the ability to meet the standards and requirements of major supermarket chains. 
These non tariff issues should be kept in mind, since they are likely to become the major 
constraints for a number of developing countries, which have difficulties meeting quality, 
certification and traceability standards. For example, a large number of developing countries will 
not be able to draw any benefit from the growing EU imports of beef which are expected to take 
place with the implementation of the Single Farm Payment because they are not free from 
particular animal diseases. 
 
From the point of view of developing countries wanting to understand the dynamics of CAP 
reform, the following factors are likely to influence the pace of change. 
•  The overall deal on the EU financial perspective for 2007-2013 which has implications 
for the level of direct payments received by EU farmers into the future. Two issues are 
important here: whether the overall size of the budget is limited to 1% of EU GNI over 
the period and, if so, whether the savings required relative to the current Commission 
proposals which are based on a ceiling of 1.14% are made in the CAP Pillar 1 budget 
(farm support) or in other budget lines (CAP Pillar 2 funding (rural development), other 
internal policies such as research or external programmes such as development 
assistance). 
•  The pace at which export subsidies are eliminated in any Doha Round agreement. While 
EU expenditure on export subsidies for agricultural exports has declined significantly in 
recent years, they still play an important role for particular commodities, notably dairy   33
and sugar. Production of both of these commodities is controlled by quota within the EU, 
so in principle supply could be curtailed to eliminate exportable surpluses and thus avoid 
the need for export subsidies should they be eliminated.
23 However, the elimination of 
export subsidies would hit producers of non-Annex 1 products (higher value added food 
products) hard, as they would be required to purchase their raw materials at high EU 
internal prices and compete with companies with access to raw materials at lower world 
market prices. The elimination of export subsidies would encourage food companies to 
become powerful advocates of lower agricultural prices within the EU. 
•  The extent to which additional market access commitments are agreed in any Doha 
Round agreement. The reduction in intervention prices which has already occurred means 
that there is currently some water in EU tariffs, i.e. they are higher than they need to be to 
keep out low-cost imports. Nonetheless, under a tiered tariff reduction formula, some EU 
tariff peaks would be cut significantly, creating pressure for a further reduction in internal 
support prices for some commodities. The number and treatment of sensitive products in 
the negotiations will be critical here, as will the nature of any agreement on the Special 
Safeguard (currently important in helping to raise the level of market protection for 
sugar).Outside the WTO framework, any attempt to resuscitate talks on a free trade area 
with Mercosur would also inevitably require market access concessions on the part of the 
EU. 
 
                                                 
23 Not all dairy product exports require export subsidies to be viable. The main EU surplus product is 
butterfat, and high value cheeses and occasionally some milk protein products can be exported without 
subsidy.   34
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